Abstract: We look at the effects of physical activity (PA) recommendation policies by considering a social multiplier model in which individuals differ in their concern for PA. The government can either observe this concern (and implement the First Best) or not (and implement a uniform policy). Whichever the type of policy implemented, while the welfare of individuals the most concerned with PA increases in the social multiplier, the welfare of those the least concerned may decrease in it. For a sufficiently high social multiplier, both government interventions improve the welfare of those most concerned with PA but worsen the welfare of the least concerned individuals if they are not too many. However, compared to the First Best, a uniform recommendation improves the welfare of those most concerned with PA more than it reduces the welfare of those least concerned.
Introduction
Using data for adults from 122 countries, Hallal et al. (2012) recently revealed that, worldwide, 31.1% of adults are physically inactive, with proportions ranging from 17% in southeast Asia to around 43% in the Americas and the eastern Mediterranean. Inactivity rises with age, is higher in women than in men, and is increased in high-income countries. These constitute unfavorable statistics from a public health perspective since physical inactivity is, respectively, the fourth and fifth leading cause of death and disability worldwide. Lee et al. (2012) quantify the ill-effects of inactivity and show that it caused 9% of premature mortality or more than 5.3 million of the 57 million deaths that occurred worldwide in 2008. 1 People benefit from even modest physical activity (PA): compared with inactive individuals, those who were active about 90 minutes per week lived three years longer (see Wen et al. 2011) . Moreover, the practice of PA decreases not only the prevalence of non-communicable diseases (NCDs) but also long-term care (LTC) dependency. 2 In fact, physically active older adults are also more likely to perform better Instrumental Activities of Daily Living and Activities of Daily Living, to have a better functional health, lower risk of falling, and better cognitive function. PA delays entrance into dependency by six to seven years (see Shephard 1991) and clearly has vast potential to improve health throughout the world. For its general health benefits and the potential decrease of health-care costs, PA promotion is now a priority for governments and health agencies. The goal of this article is to analyze the effects of PA encouragement policies, such as uniform mass media campaigns, enhancing the social determinants of PA practice. To this end, we consider a community which is composed of two types of individuals who differ in their concern for PA. Additionally, we consider "social multiplier" effects in PA practice and, in particular, we assume that the marginal productivity of PA is increasing in the aggregated amount invested by the community. Social multiplier effects have been recently used to explain topics as diverse as criminal activity (Glaeser, Sacerdote, and Scheinkman 1996) , welfare state participation (Bertrand, Luttmer, and Mullainathan 2000) , school achievement (Sacerdote 2001) , participation in retirement plans (Saez and Duflo 2003) , work and leisure (Alesina, Glaeser, and Sacerdote 2005) , and obesity (Trogdon, Nonnemaker, and Pais 2008) . Note that an externality emerges since individuals do not account for the effect of their choices on the social multiplier effect, and hence on others' utility. Consequently, individual choices will not be optimal and there is therefore scope for government intervention.
Policies to promote PA are numerous and have been recently surveyed by Kohl et al. (2012) . Among theses policies, the informational approaches of community-wide and mass media campaigns and short PA messages targeting key community sites are recommended (see the recent survey of Heath et al. 2012) . In fact, while PA is globally accepted as health-enhancing for the full range of individuals' health statuses, less consensus exists regarding whether or not PA promoting policies should be publicized and implemented. For example, there is some discussion concerning the messages used to change PA behavior; in particular, whether those emphasizing the benefits of being active are more or less effective than those emphasizing the consequences of inactivity (see Latimer, Brawley, and Bassett 2010 or Gallagher and Updegraff 2012) .
We abstract from the implementation dimension of the problem and focus solely on PA recommendation policies, since we want to assess the relevance of the uniform PA recommendations presently used worldwide within mass media campaigns. Examples of such campaigns are the "Let's Move -Get Active" in the US, "Manger-Bouger" in France, "Find thirty every day" in Australia advising adults to do 30 minutes of daily moderate PA, and the "Change4life-150 minutes" of weekly PA in the UK.
3 Importantly, the design of recommendations crucially depends on whether or not the government observes individuals' concerns for PA. When this is not observable, we suppose that the government implements a uniform policy. On the contrary, when this is observable, the government implements the First Best equilibrium. The novelty of our approach is to take into account the peer effects existing in PA practice. Research suggests that the attitude of children and adolescents toward PA greatly depends on their parents' and peers' attitudes, as well as on their overall school environment (see among others, Eder and Parker 1987; Wechsler et al. 2000; Smith 2003; Voorhees et al. 2005; Robbins, Stommel, and Hamel 2008; Efrat 2009; Babcock and Hartman 2010; or Carrell, Hoekstra, and West 2011) . Additionally, according to a recent OECD (2010, 18) recommendation, "in the design and implementation of prevention policies special attention must be placed on the role of information, externalities and self-control issues, including the role of social multiplier effects (the clustering and spread within households and social networks)." What is more, researchers put forward whether or not it is the social contact inherent within PA programs for the elderly that creates a positive relationship between PA and cognition (see for example Renaud and Bherer 2005) . In their recent survey concerning PA in old age, Hirvensalo and Lintunen (2011, 18) conclude that, "the studies reviewed also highlighted the importance of social networks in maintaining participation." We incorporate this social dimension of PA into our model by assuming that individuals' benefit from PA is increasing in the aggregate average of PA in society.
In a setting with two types of individuals as regards their concern for PA, we contrast the Laissez Faire (LF) equilibrium with two government policies. In Section 2, we first assume that the government cannot observe types, defined as different preferences regarding PA, and enforces a uniform PA level (hereafter Government equilibrium). In Section 3, we then suppose that types are observable and therefore the government can implement the First Best. In this case, types may be interpreted as heterogenous PA benefits driven from different individual health conditions (or alternatively, age or gender). In fact, according to the medical literature, a lower level of PA is needed for the elderly, or for any individual with a low exercise capacity, if health risks are to be reduced. Also, while 30-60 minutes per day of moderate to vigorous intensity PA may be needed to decrease the risk of developing breast and colon cancers, 30 minutes of moderate intensity exercise five days per week reduces the risk of type-2 diabetes by 25-36% (see PAGAC 2008) . 4 Still, government PA campaigns recommend uniform PA practice or, at most, provide different advice for children and adults.
We find that at the LF, PA individual choices are increasing in their concern for PA and in the social multiplier, as expected. The uniform government PA recommendation is above both types' individual choices if the social multiplier is high enough. Also, a uniform policy may improve the welfare of individuals the most concerned with PA, even when it reduces their level of PA. Indeed, they benefit from the multiplicative effect of the increase in PA of individuals the least concerned with PA. Yet, the most unexpected result is that the welfare of the individuals the least concerned with PA may decrease in the social multiplier if they are not too numerous. This result is surprising because the direct effect of the social multiplier is a utility increase. However, such direct effect is dominated by the effect of imposing a too high level of PA, which results from a higher weight being given to the preference of individuals the most concerned with PA (a large number), to the detriment of those the least concerned with PA.
In contrast to the uniform policy, we find that the First Best PA recommendations are always above individuals' decisions, for all strengths of the social multiplier. Also, for individuals the most (resp: least) concerned with PA, the 4 See among others, Warburton, Nicol, and Bredin (2006) , regarding PA benefits in reducing the risk of several conditions, Barnett et al. (2003) for reduction in falls and disability, Keysor (2003) for improved independence, McAuley et al. (2005) for improved psychological wellbeing, and Colcombe and Kramer (2003) , and the survey of Vogel et al. (2009) for maintenance of cognitive vitality. Yet note that PA is recommended to all ages since the risk of NCDs starts in childhood (see Warburton, Nicol, and Bredin 2006; PAGAC 2008; and WHO 2010; among others). government recommendation is larger (resp: lower) than the uniform one. While the welfare of individuals the most concerned with PA increases in the social multiplier, the welfare of individuals the least concerned with PA may decrease in it. Therefore, such a decrease is not due to the uniformity of the government intervention. Whatever their proportion, individuals the most concerned with PA are better off at the Government equilibrium rather than at the First Best for a sufficiently high social multiplier.
Finally, for a sufficiently high social multiplier, both government interventions improve the welfare of the most concerned with PA but worsen the welfare of the least concerned individuals if they are not too many. More precisely, compared to the First Best, a uniform recommendation improves the welfare of those most concerned with PA more than it reduces the welfare of those least concerned.
The rest of the article is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present our framework and contrast the LF and Government equilibria. In Section 3, we contrast the First Best, where types are observable to the LF and Government equilibria. A final section concludes. Proofs are gathered in the Appendices.
The standard framework and uniform policy advice
The economy is composed of individuals and the government. Individuals live for one period of time, of length normalized to one, and they differ according to their concern α for PA. Indeed, we suppose the community to be composed of a fraction p 2 ð0; 1Þ of individuals with a concern α A and 1 À p with a concern α B .
Without loss of generality, we assume that type A individuals have a greater concern for PA than type B individuals. The assumption 1=2 α B can be relaxed but it guarantees that our results are not due to the use of exotic frameworks with huge heterogeneity. In particular, assuming a sufficiently large concern for PA ensures equilibria with positive levels of PA. Individuals of type i (i ¼ A or B) care about consumption c i and PA θ i . They care about PA because it is good for their health and because they enjoy it. 5 The basic starting point of a social multiplier model is to assume that the marginal productivity of PA is increasing in the amount chosen by one's peers. Then, as in Alesina, Glaeser, and Sacerdote (2005) , we assume that utility is separable so that individuals maximize:
where b θ is the average amount of PA within the community. We assume H 1 ðθ i ; b θÞ > 0, H 11 ðθ i ; b θÞ < 0, and H 12 ðθ i ; b θÞ > 0. In other words, PA increases health but at a decreasing rate, and the cross-partial reflects an increase in well-being driven from social interactions taking place during PA.
In contrast with standard models of network effects (Katz and Shapiro 1985) , PA θ can be viewed as a good which is consumed in variable quantities by heterogeneous individuals, and where the magnitude of the peer effects depends on the total quantity consumed across types, rather than on the total number of individuals in the economy. In addition, the value each individual receives on account of peer effects depends on the individual's consumption, as well as on the individual's type. In other words, we have type-dependent peer effects.
Following Alesina, Glaeser, and Sacerdote (2005) , we use a specification of
utility function is thus given by:
where the parameter ε 2 ½0; 1 measures the social multiplier.
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First we focus on the LF equilibrium. Then, a type i individual chooses the level of PA θ LF i that maximizes U i , as defined by eq. [1]. Individuals take as given the average amount of PA within the community b θ. Indeed, we assume that the individual's weight in the community is too small and thus they do not account for the effect of their individual choices on b θ. From the individual problems, we obtain the following FOCs:
and: 
and:
The optimal value θ LF A is larger than θ LF B and the two values are both increasing and convex functions of ε with the same slopes.
Proof. See Appendix A. □ Proposition 1 characterizes the LF-equilibrium in which those the most concerned with PA end up consuming more of it. Additionally, the higher the social multiplier the higher the equilibrium levels of PA.
We now focus on the Government (G) equilibrium by considering a utilitarian government, which maximizes a weighted sum of individuals' utility W ¼ pU A þ ð1 À pÞU B , where U i is given by eq. [1] .
While the government knows the distribution of types in the community and recognizes that individuals have different preferences regarding PA, we suppose, in this section, that these are not observable and that it is too costly for the government to impose different levels of PA. Therefore, it chooses and enforces a uniform level θ G , irrespectively of individuals' concerns regarding PA.
We acknowledge that we abstract from the discussion about the government capability of enforcing PA recommendations and assume they are indeed enforced. In practice, we tend to believe that policies relying on incentives may be more effective than enforcement policies which are much more costly to implement. Before returning to this discussion in the conclusion, we note that it is indeed possible for the government to impose PA. An example is the common practice of compulsory PA classes in schools, according to the age of the students. Compulsory PA could indeed also be a common practice in elderly Physical Activity and Policy Recommendations care facilities, being enough to restrict licenses to the institutions fulfilling PA requirements. Yet for the time being note that PA enforcement for the overweight is being currently discussed in England, and Japan has enforced health treatments which include PA for those 40 years old and older who are over the maximum waist circumference authorized by the Metabo law.
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In contrast to individual behavior, the government internalizes the effect of individual PA levels on the community average level b θ and, b θ ¼ θ G . Thus, the government chooses the uniform level of PA θ G that maximizes the following welfare function:
where Λ ¼ pα A þ ð1 À pÞα B and the FOC being:
where, according to Assumption 1, e ε G ¼ 1=ð2ΛÞ < 1. We can state the following proposition:
Proposition 2.
The G-equilibrium θ G 2 ð0; 1 is given by:
The optimal value θ G is an increasing and convex function of ε for ε < e ε G . This function is more convex than θ When the social multiplier is high enough (ε > " ε G ), the PA level imposed by the government is above both individual types' equilibrium levels. Yet, when the social multiplier is not as strong, it is optimal for the government to impose a θ G above type B individuals' PA but below type A individuals' PA.
Since neither type of individuals internalize the effects of the social multiplier, their choices have the same slope. On the contrary, the government internalizes the social multiplier effect, and therefore the stronger this effect the more the government is willing to increase PA practice. Consequently, θ G is more convex than θ LF A and θ LF B . Finally, we focus on individuals' welfare. According to Appendix C, the welfare of type i individuals at the LF-equilibrium, denoted U LF i , and at the G-equilibrium, denoted U G i , are:
Then, concerning type A individuals welfare, we can establish that:
Both at the LF-equilibrium and at the G-equilibrium, U A is an increasing and convex function of ε and there exists a unique b ε A 2 ð0; " ε G Þ such that:
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Proof. See Appendix C. □ Proposition 3 states that whether type A individuals are better off under the uniform government recommendation depends on the social multiplier. Its results are summarized in Figure 2 .
For low levels of the social multiplier (ε < b ε A ), type A individuals are worse off under the G-equilibrium than under the LF-equilibrium. In this case, (Figure 1 ), but peer effects are not strong enough to multiply the effect of the increase of type B individuals' PA and compensate for the reduction of type A individuals' PA. On the contrary, if the social multiplier is high enough (ε > b ε A ), type A individuals are better off under the government uniform policy θ G . Indeed, when ε 2 ðb ε A ; " ε G Þ, the reduction of type A individuals'
PA is more than compensated by the increase of type B individuals' PA, whereas, when ε > " ε G , peer effects are so beneficial that, additionally, it pays to increase type A individuals' PA with respect to individual choices. The function U G A is more convex than U LF A because the government takes into account the externality associated with the social multiplier, the importance of which is increasing in ε, while individuals do not. Regarding the welfare of type B individuals, and using the threshold Moreover, there exists a unique " p b p such that:
p, there exists a unique b ε B 2 ð0;e ε G Þ such that:
Proposition 4 states that the government does better for type B individuals than the Laissez Faire if (i) there are many type B individuals to care about (p " p), so that the government weights enough their welfare and chooses a level of PA in accordance with their weaker preference for it and (ii) if peer effects are strong enough (b ε B ε e ε G ). On the contrary, the government always does better for type A individuals as long as peer effects are strong enough (Proposition 3).
In order to understand the results of Propositions 3 and 4, it is necessary to understand why U A first direct effect is that U Other indirect effects are translated into a movement along the curve U G i ð:Þ as ε, and p vary. Indeed, θ G ε;p increases in ε, and p as:
i , an increase in ε leads to a movement along U G i ð:Þ in its increasing interval and therefore such an indirect effect reinforces the first direct effect. In Figure 5 , U G A is represented as a function of the government policy θ G . As already shown, this function is concave and its maximum value is attained at θ G ε;1 , the level of PA the government would had chosen if there were no type B individuals. Since θ G is increasing in p, for interior values of p, the government optimal choice must be to the left of θ G ε;1 . Now let us observe the two effects when the social multiplier increases from ε to ε 0 . The direct effect shifts
A ). Therefore, both effects lead to a increases of type A individuals' welfare. Now, we consider Figure 6 which plots the analogous function for type B individuals. Results of Proposition 4 are illustrated in Figure 7 . This figure plots type B individuals' welfare under the LF-equilibrium (purple line) and under the G-equilibrium (orange line) as a function of the social multiplier. In this example, we assume α A ¼ 0:8 and α B ¼ 0:6. The difference
Figure 6: Ambiguous impact of ε on type B individuals' welfare among the four figures relies on the value assumed for p, the proportion of individuals with the highest concern for PA. We have assumed, from the top-left to the bottom-right, p ¼ 0:1, p ¼ 0:3, p ¼ 0:6, and p ¼ 0:9.
Two remarks can be made. First, in the four examples, U LF B is increasing in the social multiplier, whereas U G B is decreasing for p ¼ 0:9. This is precisely the result we discuss above, i.e., when type A individuals are too many the government gives little weight to type B individuals' preferences and imposes such a high level of PA that type B individuals can end up worse off. Second, for sufficiently low levels of p, individuals are better off under the LF-equilibrium than under the government policy, unless peer effects become important. An illustration is provided for p ¼ 0:1.
According to Appendix E, the threshold b ε B increases in p and b ε B j p¼0 ¼ 0 while b ε A decreases in p and b ε A j p¼1 ¼ 0. Then, there exists a unique threshold p 2 ð0; " pÞ such that b ε A is larger (resp: lower) than b ε B if and only if p is lower (resp: larger) than p. Using p and Propositions 3 and 4, we can state Corollary 1. The G-equilibrium constitutes a Pareto improvement if and only if (p < p and ε > b ε A ) or (p < p < " p and ε > b ε B ). Both individual types are worse off under the G-equilibrium if and only if (p < p and ε < b ε B ) or (p < p and ε < b ε A ).
Proof. See Appendix E. □ Corollary 1 states the conditions under which the government should undoubtedly intervene and the conditions under which there is no role for government intervention because both types end up worse off. When the proportion of type A individuals is not too high and peer effects are strong enough, both types of individuals are better off under the government policy. In this case, for sufficiently few type A individuals, i.e., p < p, type B individuals are better off under the government policy at lower peer effects than are type A individuals (because
it is those individuals who are better off under the government policy at lower peer effects (because b ε A < b ε B ). If, on the other hand, peer effects are too weak, then both individuals are worse off under the G-equilibrium and therefore there is no role for government intervention. We have shown that the existence of a social multiplier is not a reason per se to justify government intervention. This result is due to the uniform PA level imposed on both individual types, which is a common practice of government PA (mass media) campaigns such as the ones discussed in the introduction. Our contribution aims to highlight that if the social multiplier associated with PA is low, then the government may indeed harm all in society by advising a uniform level of PA.
The case with public information
In this section, we suppose that the government can implement the First Best. Thus, we assume that individual types are observable and that it is possible to enforce different PA levels. Such an exercise is only relevant as a benchmark since in the real world individuals' types are not observable. Nevertheless, there are situations in which the government can observe individual types. Returning to the PA campaigns discussed in the introduction, it is presently common practice to advise children to perform double the recommended PA for adults. We can interpret observable types as children and adults, and we abstract from any heterogeneity within the same type.
The First Best (FB) equilibrium consists of the government choices of θ
þ 2α B Þ and using the two following thresholds:
Proposition 5.
The FB-equilibrium (θ FB A ; θ FB B Þ 2 ð0; 1 Â ð0; 1 is given by:
The optimal values e θ are increasing in the social multiplier. Moreover, as discrimination is feasible, the government chooses to increase (resp: decrease) type A (resp: type B) individuals' PA relative to θ G , i.e.,
In a sense, the government is better able to take into consideration individual preferences.
Using the fact that " ε A < e ε G < " ε B and substituting in eq.
[1] the values θ FB A and θ FB B as defined above allow us to obtain:
We can thus establish: Proof. See Appendix G. □ We comment on Proposition 6 above with the help of a numerical illustration where we suppose α A ¼ 0:9, α B ¼ 0:6, and p ¼ 0:7.
In Figure 9 , we plot the PA choices θ threshold " ε A . At the beginning, the difference between the curves is not clear, and we therefore present on the right the same curves zoomed for the lowest values of ε.
In fact, the welfare of First Best is always larger (resp: lower) than the welfare of Laissez Faire for individuals of type A (resp: type B). We can also highlight that, first, for very low levels of the social multiplier, both types are worse off under the G-equilibrium than under the LF-equilibrium, in accordance with Corollary 1. Second, type A individuals benefit from any government intervention and mainly from the G-equilibrium approach for high levels of the social multiplier, in accordance with Proposition 6. In fact, they benefit from the general increase in PA imposed on society without compromising a decrease in the consumption of other goods. This effect is stronger under the G-equilibrium where a higher level of PA is imposed to type B individuals. Third, for type A individuals, the benefit associated with the government policies is most important for high levels of the social multiplier. Finally, the increase in type A individuals' welfare is made at the cost of imposing a high level of PA to type B individuals. Indeed, type B individuals are worse off under any of the two government policies than under the LF-equilibrium. Interestingly, their welfare -not only at the G-equilibrium but also at the FB-equilibrium -is decreasing even for higher levels of the social multiplier. In fact, a high social multiplier makes the government more willing to impose a higher level of PA because the positive externality effects become more important. Yet, this is done at the cost of a decrease of type B individuals' welfare.
Conclusion
We analyze the effects of PA encouragement policies when individuals differ with respect to their concern for PA and in the presence of a social multiplier effect in PA practice. If the social multiplier is strong enough, we find that uniform and First Best policies increase the welfare of the individuals the most concerned with PA, at the cost of a decrease in the welfare of those the least concerned when they are not too many. But, compared to the First Best, a uniform recommendation improves the welfare of those most concerned with PA more than it reduces the welfare of those least concerned. Moreover, the welfare of those the least concerned with PA may even be decreasing in the strength of the social multiplier, both under a uniform policy and under the First Best policy. Indeed, the social multiplier may be so strong that it may be welfare improving to increase the PA level to a degree that it harms the least concerned individuals but greatly benefits the most concerned individuals. This article can be extended in several directions. First, we focus on an aggregate externality, i.e., the social multiplier effect, and therefore individuals take as given the aggregate average of PA. Alternatively, we could assume that individuals perceive the impact of their choices on others' decisions with obvious consequences for public intervention. We believe it is worth developing a network setup in which individuals have social Physical Activity and Policy Recommendations interactions with some individuals but not with others to encompass the latter possibility. Second, we analyze only one of many possible government interventions aiming at an increase in PA. Many others include provision of sporting infrastructures, revision of urban planning to ensure that walking, cycling, and other forms of active lifestyles are accessible and safe, or to encourage PA networks, among others. Additionally, PA could be seen as voluntary contributions toward a public good, say general health in the population or PA infrastructures. Finally, along our analyses, we have considered that PA levels are enforced and verifiable but have neglected the discussion about its implementation. While the First Best policy could be decentralized by means of taxes/subsidies on PA, this is not necessarily the case for the uniform policy. A complement to our analyses could consider an incentive compatible problem assuming the concern for PA is not observable. In such a case, the government could implement a second best approach by offering a menu of contracts among which individuals would self-select. Alternatively, the government could make use of other individual characteristics correlated with PA concern as, for example, age. In this regard "tagging" could be used (see for example, Cremer, Gahvari and Lozachmeur 2010, for a recent contribution, and for a survey). Finally, a potentially relevant alternative assumption is to consider that even the individuals themselves are not fully aware of the benefits of PA for their health. Bringing uncertainty to the present setup, opens the door to explore the benefits of information disclosure mechanisms for health (and welfare) improvement (see, among others, Bardey and De Donder 2012 , for the use of genetic testing and its implications on prevention behaviors).
More specifically, recent studies have explored barriers to PA in LTC settings (see the survey of Benjamin et al. 2013) , which can occur at the individual, organizational, and environmental levels. Reported barriers include seniors' poor health, fear of falling, and a past history of sedentary lifestyles; organizational challenges such as inadequate staffing levels and institutional care routines; and environmental realities such as lack of designated spaces and equipment for PA. Future studies targeting PA interventions for residents living in LTC are needed to address these multiple levels of influence. Importantly, our study shows how uniform policies may differently affect heterogenous populations, and how important it is to carefully implement adequate levels of PA for each target population. In particular, we find our results useful in considering PA policies targeting the elderly, which have, in our view, important consequences for the provision of LTC. 
Appendix B Proof of Proposition 2
According to eq. [3] we have θ G ¼ ð1 À e ε G Þ=ð1 À εÞ. This value is lower than 1 since, according to Assumption 1, e ε G ¼ 1=ð2ΛÞ
ð1 À εÞ when ε e ε G , and θ G ¼ 1 otherwise.
After computations, @ ε θ G ¼ ½2Λ À 1=½2Λð1 À εÞ 2 and @ εε θ G ¼ ½2Λ À 1= ½Λð1 À εÞ 3 . As 2Λ > 1, @ ε θ G and @ εε θ G are positive and θ G is increasing and convex in ε.
has the sign of α A α B ½ð2 À εÞ 3 À 2ð1 À εÞ 3 
;e ε G and there exists a unique " ε G 2 ð0;e ε G Þ such that θ LF A 7 θ G if and only if ε 7 " ε G . □
Appendix C Proof of Proposition 3
According to eq.
Consequently, we have Substituting eq.
[3] into eq.
[1] allows us to obtain
have the sign of ð1 þ e ε G Þα i À 1. As e ε G > 1=ð2α A Þ and α A > 1=2 we have ð1 þ e ε G Þα A > 1. Consequently, U G A is an increasing and convex function of ε 2 ½0;e ε G Þ.
We now contrast U LF A with U G A . Using Propositions 1 and 2, we obtain
Using the facts that C > 0 and ð2 À εÞ 3 ! 8ð1 À εÞ 2 , a sufficient condition to show the positivity of
Hence, we obtain ðU
Appendix D Proof of Proposition 4
In Appendix C, we establish that U LF B is an increasing and convex function of ε and that @ ε U G B and @ εε U G B have the sign of ð1 þ e ε G Þα B À 1, i.e., after computations, the sign of According to eq.
Hence, we obtain: 
Then, after computations and using Appendix A and B,
has the sign of
The degree of this polynomial function is three and
þ 2ΛÞα B À 2Λ > 0 and consequently Pð1Þ < 0 and P 0 ð1Þ > 0. The fact that Pð0Þ > 0, Pð1Þ < 0 and P 0 ð1Þ > 0 implies the existence and the uniqueness of root ε s between 0 and 1. 9 Then, PðεÞ > 0 if 0 ε < ε s and PðεÞ < 0 if ε s < ε < 1.
Consequently, we establish:
B decreases for ε 2 ½0; ε s Þ and increases for ε 2 ðε s ;e ε G Þ.
Using Fact 1 to Fact 4, it is straightforward to establish the assertion of our proposition using the (possible) existence of two thresholds " p and p ð0 < " p p b pÞ such that:
B decreases in ε for ε 2 ½0; ε s Þ, increases in ε for ε 2 ðε s ;e ε G Þ and:
9 Obviously, Pð0Þ > 0 and Pð1Þ < 0 guarantee the existence of a root ε s between 0 and 1. If ε s is not the unique root between 0 and 1, there generally exists three roots ε 1 , ε 2 , and ε 3 such that 0 < ε 1 < ε 2 < ε 3 < 1 and P 0 ðε 1 Þ < 0, P 0 ðε 2 Þ > 0, P 0 ðε 3 Þ < 0. Then, as P 0 ð1Þ > 0, P 0 ðεÞ have at least three roots: however this is impossible since P 0 ðεÞ is a polynomial function of degree 2.
Consequently ε s is unique.
The threshold p is defined, according to Fact 1 to Fact 4, from the value of p such that ðU 
To summarize, the threshold b ε B increases in p and b ε B j p¼0 ¼ 0 while b ε A decreases in p and b ε A j p¼1 ¼ 0. Then, there exists a unique threshold p 2 ð0; " pÞ such that b ε A is larger (resp: lower) than b ε B if and only if p is lower (resp: larger) than p. Using p and Propositions 3 and 4, the assertion of Corollary 1 is straightforward. □
Appendix F Proof of Proposition 5
To determine the FB-equilibrium, the government chooses θ
We first analyze the case of interior solutions (Step 1) and then consider the possibility of corner solutions (Step 2).
)
Step 1 -The case of interior solutions θ When FB-equilibrium has interior solutions ð e θ A ; e θ B Þ 2 ð0; 1Þ Â ð0; 1Þ, the government solves:
After simplifications, the two FOC are given by:
Rearranging terms we obtain:
The value V decreases (and is concave) when ε varies from 0 to 1. As Vj ε¼0 < 0 and Vj ε¼1 > 0, there exists a unique " ε V 2 ð0; 1Þ such that V is positive if and only if ε 2 ½0; " ε V Þ. As ε 2 ½0; 1, we have u 
Similarly, it is obvious that u FB B
is positive and increases in ε. As
there exists a unique e ε B 2 ð0; " ε V Þ such that e θ FB B 2 ð0; 1Þ if and only if ε 2 ½0;e ε B Þ.
After computations, 
e., the sign of
Then, the discriminant Δ A of the polynomial function Q A ðεÞ is such that
2 . Consequently, the lowest root of P A ðεÞ is
As P A ð0Þ > 0 and ε A > 1, we have P A ðεÞ > 0 for all ε 2 ½0; 1 and, consequently, e θ FB A > θ G .
Physical Activity and Policy Recommendations
Note that
increases in ε.
Moreover, as N B and @ ε N B are positive, and @ ε V is negative, e θ FB B is a convex function of ε if ε 2 ½0;e ε B Þ. Remark that e θ 
Consequently, the lowest root of P B ðεÞ is 
The positivity of this quantity implies that e θ FB A ¼ e θ FB B arises for a e θ larger than 1. Hence, " ε A < e ε B < 1 and e θ FB A > e θ FB B for all ε 2 ½0;e ε B Þ.
)
Step 2 -The case of corner solutions θ 
which is lower than 1 if and only if ε < " ε B ¼ 1=ðα B þ ΛÞ.
is an increasing and convex function of ε.
has the sign of ð2Λ À 1Þ2α B ½1 À εð1 À pÞ À 2Λð1 À εÞ½2α B À 1 þ pεðα A þ α B Þ, i.e., the sign of
, the polynomial function R B ðεÞ has two positive roots and the product of these roots is given by
> 0 and R B ð1Þ > 0, the two roots of R B ðεÞ are larger than 1 and R B is positive for all ε 2 ð0; 1Þ. Consequently,
)
Step 3 -Characterization and properties of the FB-equilibrium.
Using Steps 1 and 2, it is straightforward to obtain that the FB-equilibrium ðθ FB A ; θ FB B Þ 2 ð0; 1 Â ð0; 1 is given by:
In Step 1, we have established that e θ FB A and e θ FB B are both increasing and convex functions of ε. In Step 2, we have established that " θ FB B is an increasing and convex function of ε. Combining Steps 1 and 2, we have also established that
Appendix G Proof of Proposition 6
We separately study the welfare of each type of individual.
Step 1 -Characterization of type A individuals' welfare at the FBequilibrium.
Physical Activity and Policy Recommendations
We first focus on the welfare of type A individuals when ε < " ε A . Merging eqs.
[6] and [7] in Appendix F gives 
Then, G 00 ðεÞ is positive. As
is a convex function of ε. We now focus on type A individuals' welfare when " ε A ε < e ε G . As θ As θ FB B is a positive, increasing and convex function of ε, it is straightforward to establish that U FB A is an increasing and convex function of ε.
)
Step 2 -Characterization of type B individuals' welfare at the FBequilibrium.
We now focus on type B individuals' welfare when ε < " ε A . Merging eqs.
[6] and [7] in Appendix F gives εðα A þ α B Þ b θ ¼ 2 À 2α A À 2α B þ 2α A ð1 À pεÞ e θ A þ 2α B ½1 À ð1 À pÞε e θ B .
Then, according to eq. [6] and using the fact that 2α A ð1 À pεÞ e θ A ¼ 2α A À 1þ εðα A þ α B Þð1 À pÞ e θ B , we obtain ðα A þ α B Þε b θ ¼ ½2α B þ εð1 À pÞðα A À α B Þ e θ B À ð2α B À 1Þ.
Then, the utility U is an increasing function for sufficiently low values of ε.
We now focus on type B individuals' welfare when " ε A ε < e ε G . Using the fact that U 
